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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
the DIVISION OF FORESTRY, FIRE,
& STATE LANDS,
Plaintiff, Appellee, and
Cross-Appellant,
Case No. 20040868 - CA

TOOELE COUNTY. UTAH: SIX MILE
RANCH COMPANY, a Utah
corporation: CRAIG S. BLEAZARD. an
individual: MARK C. BLEAZARD. an
individual: JOHN P . BLEAZARD. an
individual: and the AMERICAN OIL
COMPANY, a Maryland corporation,
Defendants, Appellants,
and Cross-Appellees.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
STATE OF UTAH, DIVISION OF FORESTRY, FIRE & STATE LANDS

Appellee/Cross-Appellant, State of Utah, Division of Forestry, Fire and State
Lands ("State"), Replies to Appellants VCross-Appellees' ("Appellants") Reply Brief,
touching upon those matters it believes need clarification and response, as follows:

1

I.

THE PASS CANYON AND CABLE GATE ROADS WERE UNSIGNED
AND UN-GATED ROADS THAT WERE CONTINUOUSLY USED BY THE
PUBLIC WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THE EARLY 1950s UNTIL 1993
WHEN THE MAIN ROAD WAS GATED BY THE APPELLANTS.
A.

The Appellants' Concession that the Un-gated Pass Canyon and Cable Gate
Roads were Unmarked Roads is Supported by Every Relevant Finding of
the Court.

Appellants argue that the State is challenging the trial court's findings regarding
whether the Pass Canyon and Cable Gate Roads were signed. (Reply Br. of Appellants at
9). The State does not challenge any evidentiary finding of the lower court. This court
should thus reject Appellants' attempt to revive a point that they have already conceded:
that there is no evidence of "any additional signage that existed . . . at the entrances to the
side roads." (Br. of Appellants at 21). Appellants' concession is consistent with all the
trial court's relevant findings: Finding ^J 25 clearly shows that if any "No Trespassing"
signs were adjacent to the main road, they were miles away from the Pass Canyon and
Cable Gate Roads and referred to adjacent private property1 (See Illustrative Map,
Attached as Addendum A); and Finding ]f 57 expressly states that there was no "no
trespassing" sign adjacent to the Pass Canyon Road. It is undisputed that the Pass Canyon
and Cable Gate Roads were un-gated.

1

On page 9 of Appellants' Response, Appellants attempt to apply findings,
specifically Finding If 51 (mis-cited by Appellants as Finding ^f 52), from the third sideroad originally litigated (the "South Road"), and which is not on appeal, to the Pass
Canyon and Cable Gate Road. This effort misdirects this Court to apply the Finding to
roads not intended by it.
2

B.

Ejection of Trespassers from Adjacent Lands Does Not Interrupt the
Continuous Use of Un-gated and Unmarked Roads Themselves.

This court should reject Appellants' argument that owner actions in ejecting
trespassers from their private lands adjacent to the Pass Canyon and Cable Gate Roads
constitutes an interruption of the continuous use of the roads themselves. (See Reply Br.
of Appellants at 6-9). Every reference cited by the Appellants regarding the Pass Canyon
and Cable Gate Roads relates to the removal of individuals for trespassing or interfering
with adjacent private lands, not for using the Pass Canyon or Cable Gate roads
themselves. (Reply Br. of Appellants at 6-8). Not one person testified to ever asking
permission to use the roads or ever being removed from the roads.
The State acknowledges that, after 1977 for the Pass Canyon Road and 1987 on
the Cable Gate Road, there was some testimony by the Appellants that they asked people
to leave the side roads. (R. 1150 at 371, 375, 380). Even if these limited actions show
termination of these persons' use of the un-gated and unmarked roads, they constitute
mere intermissions rather than interruptions in the public's continuous use of the roads.
See Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). See also
Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981) (upholding continuous use of road
despite defendant's occasional blocking of road). Regardless, there is absolutely no
evidence or Findings that any landowner removed anyone from the Pass Canyon Road
prior to 1977 or the Cable Gate Road prior to 1987. Thus a minimum of twenty-five to

3

thirty-five years of continuous use of the roads had been established prior to Appellant
Bleazards' actions.2
The Appellants' argument, if adopted by this court, would essentially repeal the
public dedication statute, Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, which plainly allows the
dedication of public roads across private lands. Evidence of ejection from adjacent
private property as cited by Appellants is not relevant to determining whether the roads
themselves meet the "sole requirement" of being continuously used by the public for ten
years. Thurman, 626 P.2d at 449.
C.

The Trial Court Was Correct in Holding that Landowners Must Take an
Overt Action to Distinguish Between Public and Permissive Users

Appellants argue that use of the side roads crossing the West Stansbury Island was
permissive because the landowners "permitted" the public free and open access to the
roads.3 (Reply Br. of Appellants at 12, n.4, 17-19). However, there is no evidence that the
landowners granted express permission to the vast majority of users or placed any barrier
to use of the roads until the early 1990s for the Cable Gate Road and 1993 for the Pass

2

Conclusion of Law ^f 17, cited by the Appellants, demonstrates that the trial court
only considered the termination of public use occurring after 1977 on the Pass Canyon
Road, and 1987 on the Cable Gate Road, and erroneously failed to consider more than
twenty-five to thirty-five years of un-controverted evidence of continuous use occurring
prior to these time periods. (See Brief of Appellee at 41-47).
3

Permissive use is a defense to the "public thoroughfare" element of the
dedication statute, Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. See Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962
P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1998). See Br. of Appellee at 21, 24-30 for a discussion of the
elements necessary to prove a dedication.
4

Canyon Road. Therefore, by "permitted," Appellants must mean passive permission failure to object or acquiescence. The trial court rejected the argument that passive
permission was enough to distinguish public users from permissive users, holding "[a]n
overt act is required by the owner to distinguish the general public from a permissive
user." (R. 1030-31; Conclusions of Lawfflf10, 11).
Utah law requires a landowner to take some overt action to distinguish the general
public's use of a road at will from permissive use. See Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942
P.2d 307, 311-12 (Utah 1997) (holding road was public thoroughfare because there was
no evidence that public's use was interrupted and because public felt free to use road
whenever convenient or necessary); Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809 (holding Campbell's overt
act of opening and closing gate constituted permissive use, thus road was not public
thoroughfare). See also Hubbard v. Curtiss, 684 P.2d 842, 849 (Alaska 1984) (holding
"without an actual entry or other overt action," landowner cannot affect continuity of
adverse possession); 28A C.J.S. Easements § 34 (2005), WL CJS Easements § 34 ("The
owner of a servient tenement is not permitted to silently watch as an open use continues
and then, at the end of the prescriptive period, assert that it was permissive because he did
not object."); (Br. of Appellee at 24-30 for discussion of public thoroughfare). Overt
action puts the public on notice that its use of the road is "at the [landowner's]
convenience, rather than at the convenience of the public." Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809.
On the other hand, passive permission or acquiescence goes only toward showing intent.
Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d at 449. While landowner intent is not dispositive,
5

acquiescence supports a dedication because the landowner's intent to dedicate "may be
inferred from his acquiescence55 Id. (quoting Wilson v. Hull, 7 Utah 90, 92 (1890)). See
also 28A C.J.S. Easements § 34 (2005), WL CJS Easements § 34 ("A license or
permissive use .. . must be distinguished from mere acquiescence, in that permission is
evidence that claimant does not have an easement by prescription, whereas acquiescence
is evidence that he does.55).
In this case, as in Simpson, the "landowners55 on West Stansbury Island took no
action whatsoever until 1987 on the Cable Gate Road and after 1977 through agent, John
Bleazard, on the Pass Canyon Road, to distinguish permissive users from the general
public. Prior to these dates, there is no evidence of interruption of the public's use of the
roads for the preceding decades. The landowners5 acquiescence to public use later only
bolsters the State's claim that the road was a public thoroughfare. While the State does
not dispute the fact that some people using the roads were permissive users,4 such as
private or business invitees, the evidence demonstrates that for more than ten years the
general public felt free to use the roads whenever convenient or necessary.5 Because the

4

Permissive use of a road does not preclude dedication where there is evidence
that the general public also used the road whenever convenient or necessary. See Heber
City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 312 n.10 (Utah 1997); Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d
447, 449 (Utah 1981).
5

See Br. of Appellee at 13 n.5 for list of affidavits showing public use of the Pass
Canyon Road. See Br. of Appellee at 17 n.6 for list of affidavits showing public use of
the Cable Gate Road.
6

public could use the roads whenever convenient or necessary, the side roads are public
thoroughfares and the trial court erred in concluding otherwise.
II.

APPEALING ISSUES GENERATED BY THE JUDGE'S DECISION IS
APPROPRIATE AND APPELLANTS' CLAIM THAT THE STATE FIRST
RAISED THE ISSUE OF APPELLANTS' AUTHORITY FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL IS WITHOUT MERIT.
Appellants' challenge the State's assertion that they had no authority to ask anyone

to leave the Cable Gate Road on behalf of an owner. This, they claim, is raised for the
first time on appeal. Such argument is clearly without merit.
This issue - that "owners" asked people to leave the side roads and treated them
differently from the West Stansbury Road, was raised by the Court in its Findings,
Conclusion and Decision. Matters relied on by the Court are clearly within the realm of
appealable issues and are ripe for comment and response. The issue of who an "owner" is
and who acted on behalf of "owners" is thus appropriate for review and appeal.
The State's appeal challenges the Trial Court's Conclusions that the side roads
were not dedicated to the public because "owners" treated the side roads differently from
the main West Stansbury Road, and "owners" asked people to leave the side roads. In
determining whether the Court erred, the State examined the entire record to ascertain
whether any "non-owner" had been given authority to act on an owner's behalf. The
State found nothing.

7

While Appellant John Bleazard and employee of Six Mile Ranch, Craig Smith,
testified that they asked people to leave the Cable Gate Road after 1977 and 1983
respectively (R.l 150 at 325, 371, 380; R.l 151 at 429), neither testified that he did so
before that time, or that he was an owner or had authority on behalf of an owner to do so.
There was no need for the State to raise any objection to such testimony because "nonownership" was not an issue. The Court's reliance on "owners," raised a legitimate issue
as to what the Court was relying on and what authority Appellants had.
Appellants thereafter respond to the merits of the State's Argument. In doing so, it
is significant to note that they do not dispute or challenge the State's representation of
ownership on the Island as noted in its brief. Conceded by them is that until 1987,
Appellants had no ownership of the Cable Gate property, and only owned a small portion
of the property over which the Pass Canyon Road traverses.
Appellants also have not disputed the State's assertion that no "owner" of the
Cable Gate Road treated the road differently than the main road, or asked anyone to leave
it prior to 1987. Appellants simply invent a justification for asking people to leave the
road based on their claim that some prior ancestors were "relatives" to the "owner," and
that they were running cattle on "open range." No legal justification is cited, no evidence
is presented, and no logical explanation is given to equate "non-owners" with "owners"
for purposes of this case. Being a cousin, aunt, or relative of some nature does not equate
to "ownership," but only shows that someone was related to an owner.

8

Appellants also do not challenge the State's argument that no "owner" of the Pass
Canyon Road considered the road differently prior to 1977. Every reference to an
"owner" in its Reply, referred to people being asked to leave private lands to the side of
the road. Appellants point to nothing in the Record that refers specifically to the Road
itself, which dedication is subject to Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104, and not to actions on
properties to the sides of the road. The State has never attempted to dedicate private
property that is not a road. The undisputed fact that no evidence exists prior to 1977 that
any "owner" asked anyone to leave the Pass Canyon Road itself clearly demonstrates the
error of the Trial Court.
It was Appellant John Bleazard's testimony that he asked people to leave the Cable
Gate Road after 1977 (R.l 150 at 325, 371), that raised the issue on this road. Clearly, he
and his brothers were not an "owner." To what degree the Trial Court relied on
Appellants' ownership "after" 1987 to reach back to pre-1987 time frames is unclear,
because the Court's Findings and Conclusions were non-specific as to what "owners" it
was referring to. Appellants' ownership and authority is therefore a legitimate issue.
Because the evidence is clear, undisputed, and unrebutted by Appellants that prior
to 1987 no "owner" asked anyone to leave, and no "owner" considered the Cable Gate
Road differently than the public nature of the West Stansbury Road, the Trial Court could
only be referring to post-1987 time frames when Appellants owned Cable Gate Road
property, a period of time well after the Road was dedicated to the Public.

9

The State was absolutely justified in analyzing and arguing that John Bleazard and
the other Appellants had no authority as an owner to ask people to leave the Cable Gate
Road prior to 1987, and the Pass Canyon Road prior to 1977.
Since Appellants were not landowners on the Cable Gate property prior to 1987,
and at trial presented no evidence or testimony that they had any authority to act on behalf
of an owner, the State's position that they had "no authority to grant or deny permission to
use the Cable Gate Road" is accurate and proper.
Appellants themselves openly support the State's position when they admits at
page 11 of their Reply Brief, that the Court made no Finding or Conclusion that John
Bleazard or any other "non-owner" had any authority to act in the stead of an owner. That
is exactly what the State is arguing. The Court limited its decision to actions of "owners,"
and it is here that reversible error was committed.
Appellants' argument that they had authority to ask people to leave the side roads
because they were somehow related to the "owners" of the parcels, and because they were
allowed to run cattle on the "open range" is without merit, and irrelevant to the Court's
determination that "owners" actions and beliefs were the determining factor.6

6

Appellants have neither argued "how" such relationships create "ownership"
rights nor presented any evidence to establish these relationships as "authority" as being
equivalent to "owners." To entertain this argument would require the Court of Appeals to
invent evidence not a part of the record and create new Findings and Conclusions.
10

CONCLUSION
Appellee/Cross Appellant, State of Utah, urges this Court to reject Appellants'
claims on appeal and reverse the Trial Court as it relates to the Cable Gate and Pass
Canyon Roads. These two side roads were used by the public for decades before the
Appellants treated them as private. As such, they should be declared dedicated to the
public as requested by the State.
Respectfully submitted this Z7

day of October, 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

Stephen G. Schwendiman
Alison D. Garner
Jonathan G. Jemming
Assistant Attorneys General
160 E. 300 South, 5th Floor
PO BOX 140815
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0815
Telephone: (801) 366-0216
Attorneys for Appellee/Cross Appellant
State of Utah
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ADDENDUM A
Map showing location of "No Trespassing" signs.
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